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Executive Summary 
This paper investigates optimal trade policies for a developing small open economy 
which faces international price uncertainty.  Trade taxes are used to finance provision of a 
public good, which enters the utility function of consumers.  If demands for private goods 
are independent of the public good, the optimal composite tariff dominates the optimal 
quota.  If the optimal state-contingent tariff increases with the foreign price, the optimal 
specific tariff also dominates the optimal quota, regardless of risk aversion.  However, the 
ranking of the optimal specific tariff and the optimal quota generally depends on risk 
attitudes as  well as  ordinal preferences. OPTIMAL TRADE POLICIES FOR A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
Free trade is  rarely practiced by developing countries despite its  well  known optimality 
for small open economies.  Staiger and Tabellini (1987,  p.  823) observed that "active 
protectionist programs are widely pursued by countries with little or no  apparent world 
market power."  The tariff was the principal source of federal revenue in the U.S.  during 
the nineteenth century, and was not displaced until the income tax was adopted.  The works 
of Boadway, Maital and Prachowny (1973), Vanek (1971), and Feehan (1988) suggest that 
tariff revenue may be the main source of financing public goods  in LDCs.  Ethier (1988) 
cited for example that the government of Uganda derived two thirds of revenue from trade 
taxes in 1984, and Lesotho raised about 69  percent of its revenue from trade restrictions in 
1983.  Thus, trade taxes may be justified for the provision of public goods in LDCs.  An 
important question is  whether the governments of LDCs should use  taxes or quotas. 
A substantial amount has  been written concerning the ranking of tariffs and quotas 
under uncertainty.  In a seminal paper, Fishelson and Flatters (1975) pointed out that the 
equivalence between policy  instrumen~s breaks down under uncertainty, and initiated a 
study of ranking tariffs and quotas.1  The optimal tariff for a small country is  zero except 
under factor market distortions (Batra and Naqvi,  1987) or under variable returns to  scale 
(Choi and Yu, 1984).2  Thus, the literature - apart from that dealing with the large country 
case - has developed by imposing a constraint on expected imports or on expected 
government revenue, and comparing consumer surpluses under alternative regimes.  For 
example, Pelcovitz (1976) and Young and Anderson (1980) compared quotas with tariffs that 
yield the same level of expected import.
3 
Young and Anderson's (1982) more recent work represents a landmark in the literature 
of ranking of trade policies under uncertainty for two reasons.  First, they employed 
expected utility analysis, rather than expected surplus area which is  known to be a valid welfare criterion under restrictive conditions.
4  Second, they showed that the ranking of 
ex ante policies depends crucially on the property of the optimal state-contingent policy. 
Their analysis suggests that the policy with an implicit tariff which moves in the same 
direction, rather than in the opposite direction, as  the optimal state-contingent policy is  the 
dominant policy. 
An important criticism of the existing literature concerns the lack of rationale for trade 
restrictions.  If the tariff revenue is  rebated to consumers, as  is  conventionally assumed, 
there is  no intrinsic rationale for trade restrictions and hence the optimal tariff is  zero.  On 
the other hand, if the tariff or quota revenue is  used to  finance government purchases of 
public goods, the ranking of tariff and quota must be based, not just on the mean, but on 
the entire distribution of government revenue. 
The purpose of this paper is  to investigate optimal trade policies for an LDC which uses 
trade taxes for provision of the public good.  The model extends Young and Anderson 
(1982) and Feehan (1988) in two important ways.  First, we employ Feehan's (1988) 
assumption that the government provides a public good which enters the utility function of 
consumers and that all trade taxes are used to purchase the public good.5  Second, we  adopt 
Young and Anderson's (1982) expected utility framework to  investigate the ranking of 
alternative policies. 
The plan of this paper is  as  follows.  Section I constructs a general equilibrium model 
which links trade and provision of the public good.  Section II investigates the properties of 
the optimal state-contingent policy while section III analyzes the properties of ex ante 
optimal quota and tariff schedules.  Section IV shows that under weak separability the 
optimal composite tariff dominates the optimal quota.  When a single instrument is  used,  the 
ranking of ex ante second best policies requires information about cardinal, as  well as 
ordinal, preferences.  Section V provides a brief summary and concluding remarks. 
2 I.  Trade and Provision of the Public Good 
Consider an open economy which uses  trade taxes to  finance provision of the public 
good.  A  general equilibrium model is  developed employing the following assumptions. 
(i)  The domestic economy consists of N  identical consumers.
6 
(ii)  Two private goods, the exportable Z  (numeraire) and the importable Yare 
produced and consumed domestically. 
(iii)  For all realizations of the foreign price of the importable, p*, the economy imports 
Y. 
(iv)  The economy is  small and the distribution of the world price is  exogenous. 
(v)  One unit of the exportable produces one unit of the public good.  Provision of the 
public good is  solely financed by tariff/quota revenue.  Since N  is  large, each 
consumer ignores the impact of his consumption decisions on government revenue. 
(vi)  Domestic demands for traded goods are independent of the public good, i.e., 
consumer preferences are weakly separable in private goods and the public good. 
(vii)  The public good is  not traded. 
The exportable Z  is  the numeraire and its price is  unity.  Let p*  and p denote the 
world price and the domestic price of the importable Y,  respectively.  Production decisions 
are made after the foreign and domestic prices are known.  The production possibility 
frontier of the private goods, in per capita form, is  given by 
Z  =  F(Y), F' < 0, F' < 0,  (1) 
where Y and Z  denote the per capita domestic production of· the importable and the 
exportable, respectively.  Recall that one unit of the exportable is  required to  produce one 
unit of the public good, G, i.e., Z  is  an intermediate input to  produce the public good G. 
Thus, Z  represents the gross production of the exportable, the net output of the exportable 
is  Z  - G, and private income is  (Z - G) + G  + pY =  Z + pY.  Producers of the private 
3 goods choose Y and Z  to  maximize private income, I = Z  + pY.  The first order condition is 
p + F' =  O.  (2) 
The domestic per capita supply of the importable, Y(p), is  positively sloped since Y'(p) = -
l/F" >  O.  While consumer income is  endogenous, dl/dp =  Y by the Envelope Theorem, and 
hence private income I =  Z  + P Y(p) increases with p. 
Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone increasing von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function u(C,X,G), where C and X  denote the individual consumption 
of the exportable and the importable, respectively.  If consumer demands for private goods 
are independent of the public good, consumer preferences can be represented by a weakly 
separable function, 
U(C,X,G) =  U[f(C,X),G] .  (3) 
Unlike the conventional trade models, tariff revenue is  not rebated to  consumers but is  used 
to  purchase the public good G.  The representative consumer makes consumption decisions 
after observing the domestic price p.  Since consumer income is  spent only on private 
consumption goods, the budget constraint is 
C + pX =  I.  (4) 
The first order condition is 
UX(C,X,G)/UC<C,X,G) =  p. 
However, the marginal rate of substitution between private goods is  independent of the 
public good by weak separability.  Thus, the demand functions of the representative 
consumer can be written as 
C = C(p,I,G) = C(p,I),  X  =  X(p,I,G) =  X(p,l) 
4 
(5) and CG = XG = O.  Substituting the demand functions into (3) gives the indirect utility 
function, 
V[p,I,G]  ==  U[f(C(p,I),X(p,I»,G] .  (6) 
Using the endogenous income, I(p) =  F(Y) + pY(p), the per capita import demand 
function can be written as 
Q(p)  ==  M(p,I(p» =  X(p,I(p» - Y(p).  (7) 
Observe that since the domestic supply Y(p) depends only on its price, MI =  XI.  The per 
capita net export of the exportable is  (Z - G  - C).7  Recall that trade taxes are the only 
source of financing the provision of the  public good.  Thus, the total government revenue, 
in terms of the numeraire, is  N(p - p*)Q(p).  Moreover, one unit of the numeraire Z  is 
required to produce one unit of the public good.
8  Thus, the total quantity of the  public 
good provided is  equal to  government revenue 
G  =  tNQ(p),  (8) 
where t  ==  p  - p*  is  the specific tariff. 
II.  Optimal State-Contingent Policy 
The first best policy for optimal provision of the public good may be  taxes on income, 
production or consumption.  However, tariffs are the major revenue sources for the 
governments of most LDCs.  Thus, we  begin by considering the optimal state-contingent 
tariff.  It should be noted that since trade restriction by a tariff or a quota is  assumed to  be 
the sole  means of raising revenue, the "optimal" policy here is  a second best policy. 
Weitzman (1974,  p.  481) points out that "an  ideal instrument of central control would  be 
a contingent message whose instructions depend on which state of the world is  revealed." 
Since the optimal state-contingent policies - specific and ad valorem tariffs and quotas -
5 are chosen under cond.itions of certainty, they are all equivalent for any desired level of the 
public good. 
After the world price is  known, the policy maker's problem is  to choose p  to  maximize 
J(p,p*) =  V[p,F(Y) + pY,N(p - p*)Q(p)] .  (9) 
Note that by Roy's identity, V  p  =  - V IX, and p + F' =  O.  Differentiating (9) with respect 
to  p yields Jp. =  V  p + VI(Ip) + V  G(Gp).  Moreover, that for a given level of the public good 
G, dV  /dp =  V  P + VI(lp) =  - VIQ, and d2V  /dp2 =  VnQ2  + VI(XIQ - Q').  If G  is  given and 
the consumer is  risk neutral (Vn =  0), then V is  convex (concave) in p if XIQ - Q' is 
positive (negative) or TJ  + €/s > «) 0, where € ==  - (dQ/dp)(p/Q) is  the price elasticity of 
import demand,  TJ  ==  (aQ/aI)(I/Q) = (ax/al)(I/Q) is  the income elasticity of import demand, 
and s  ==  pQ/I is  the budget share of the imports.  Thus, the first order condition is  written 
(10) 
This implies that Gp  is  positive in equilibrium.  The second order condition requires that 
Jpp < o.  If the left side of (10) is  evaluated at the revenue maximizing tariff, then Gp =  0 
and Jp <  O.  Thus, the optimal state-contingent tariff is  always less  than the revenue-
maximizing tariff, i.e., 
t  < p/€  (II) 
Rearranging (10) yields an alternative expression for the equilibrium condition, 
N(V  G/V  I) = Q/(Q + tQ')  ; or  V  G/V  I = a ==  Q/N(Q + tQ')  (12) 
where V  G/VI is  the individual marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the public good G  for 
private expenditure I, and 9(Q) ==  Q/(Q + tQ')  reflects the social marginal cost of "providing" 
the public good via trade taxes.  The presence of N  in (12) indicates the pure public good 
6 characteristic of G.  Optimality requires equating the sum of individual MRS to  the social 
marginal cost of the public good.
9  Alternatively, the condition V  G/V  I =  e  means that the 
individual MRS must be equated to  the per capita social marginal cost of the public good e. 
Since one unit of the numeraire good produces one unit of the public good, the social 
marginal cost of providing the public good should be unity if a nondistortionary method of 
financing G  were available.  Except when the import demand is  totally price inelastic (Q' = 
0), a tariff necessarily distorts the relative price between the private goods.  The fact that 
only a distortionary tariff or quota is  employed implies that N(V  G/V  I) exceeds unity at an 
optimum. 
To illustrate the link between the optimal state-contingent tariff and optimal provision 
of the public good, consider the following problem of a policy maker to  choose the optimal 
mix of the public good G  and private expenditure I: 
maximize  V(p,I,G)  subject to B =  I + eG  (13) 
where e  is  the price or tax each consumer must pay to consume the public good or the  per 
capita social marginal cost of the public good each consumer bears, and B is  full income.  In 
addition to money income, "full income" includes the value of nonmarket goods (e.g.  public 
goods).  Unlike private consumption goods, the price of the public good e is  endogenous, 
and depends on the prices, p and p*.  However, for given p and p*,  the price of the public 
good e  is  constant, and the full income constraint is  linear in private expenditure I and the 
public good G.10  Optimality requires that the indifference curve V(p,I,G) be tangent to  the-
full income constraint in (I,G) space, i.e., V  G/VI = e.  Thus, the per capita social marginal 
cost of the public good in (12) can be viewed as  the price of the public good each consumer 
pays  through trade taxes.  It can be shown that I is  a normal good (aI/aB ~ 0)  if ev  IG -
V  GG ~ 0 and G  is  a normal good (aG/aB ~ 0) if V1G  - eVIl ~  O. 
We  now investigate how an increase in the world price of the importable affects the 
7 optimal state-contingent policy.  Let tf be  the optimal state-contingent tariff and pf = p*  + 
tf(p*) be the optimal state-contingent domestic price of the importable.  Observe that the 
signs of dtf/dp* and dpf/dp* are independent of N.  Without loss of generality, we  assume 
N = 1 in the rest of the paper.  Differentiating (10)  totally gives Jpp*dp* + Jppdp = 0,  or 
where Jpp < 0 by the second order condition, and 
Using Gp = Q/9 from (10) and Gp* = - Q, we  obtain 
(14) 
Recall from the implicit maximization problem in (13), the first term in (14)  is  greater than 
or equal to zero if private expenditure I is  a normal good.  The following proposition 
indicates that dtf/dp* is  bounded from below, dtf/dp* >  - l. 
PROPOSITION  I:  Assume that private expenditure I is  a normal good (al/aB ~ 0).  Then 
the optimal state-contingent domestic price of the importable increases with the world price, 
dpf/dp* >  O. 
Next, how does the optimal state-contingent tariff respond to  a change in the world 
price p*?  Using tf =  pf - p*, we  have 
where using VIp = - VnX - VIXI and VGp = - VIGX (due to  weak separability), 
(15) 
8 + (- ev  IG + V  GG)Q2 /92 + V  G(2Q' + tQ"). 
Using (81/8B) + 9(8G/8B) =  I  and rearranging terms, we  have 
Jpp + Jpp* = [9(81/8B) - I]Q2H/92 + VI(XIQ - Q')  + V  G(Q' + tQ")  (16) 
=  (Tf  - m)Q2H/9 + VI(XIQ - Q')  + V  G(Q' + tQ") 
where T  ==  tip is  the ad valorem tariff in terms of the domestic price, m  ==  9(8G/8B) is  the 
marginal propensity to consume the public good, and H  ==  29V  IG - V  GG - 9 2V  II > 0 and is 
the Hessian of the maximization problem in (13).  The sum of the terms in (16) is  positive, 
if T€  - m  > 0,  TJ  + f/S > 0 and - tQ"/Q' >  1. 
PROPOSITION 2:  Sufficient conditions for the optimal state-contingent tariff to  increase 
(decrease) with p*  are: 
(i)  T€  is  greater (less)  than m, 
(ii) - tQ"/Q' is  greater (less)  than unity, and 
(iii)  TJ  + f/S is  greater (less)  than zero. 
Intuitively, if the product of the ad valorem tariff rate '1  and the price elasticity of the 
import demand f  is  large relative to  the marginal propensity to  consume ('1f  > m), the 
import demand function is  sufficiently convex in  price (-tQ"/Q' ~ I), and the weighted sum 
of elasticities (TJ  + f/S) is  positive, then the optimal state-contingent tariff increases with p*. 
III.  Properties of Ex Ante Second Best Policies 
The main difficulty with implementing the optimal state-contingent policy is  that the 
policy maker must have full information, without delay, about the state of the world.  If 
information is  costly to  obtain or is  not available instantaneously, the burden of full 
information is  likely to  outweigh the potential gains from the optimal state-contingent 
9 policy.  Weitzman (1974,  p.  481) thus observed that "it is  infeasible for the centre to 
transmit an entire schedule of ideal prices or quantities," because "the contingent message  is 
complicated, expensive to draw up and hard to understand." 
For this reason, we focus on two widely used second best policies, ex ante tariffs and 
quotas.
ll  The policy maker is  assumed to  choose, before observing the foreign price, either 
(a) a fixed quota, or (b) a combination of a specific tariff and an ad valorem tariff.  We 
now investigate the properties of second best policies, and demonstrate that the effects of 
price uncertainty on the levels of second best instruments generally depend on cardinal 
preferences. 
Optimal Quota 
When a quota is  imposed, government revenue (p  - p*)Q is  raised by auctioning the 
quota rights.  Although government revenue depends on the realized foreign price p*, the 
import demand is  independent of G  due to weak separability, and hence is  unaffected by 
random fluctuations of the foreign price p*.  Thus, fixing an import quota is  equivalent to 
fixing the domestic price.  Let Qo denote the optimal quota and Po  be the corresponding 
domestic price of the importable, i.e., Qo = Q(po).  The policy maker's problem is  to  choose 
Po  to  maximize the expected indirect utility 
(17) 
where 10  =  F(Y(po» + Po Y(Po)  is  the private expenditure under the optimal quota.  The first 
order condition is 
(I8) 
Two interrelated questions are:  how do increases in price uncertainty and risk attitudes 
affect the optimal quota?  Differentiating (17) with respect to p*  twice yields 
10 Jpp* =  Q[QV IG - (Q + tQ')V GG] - v  GQ'  (19) 
Jpp*p* =  V  GGGQ2(Q + tQ')  - Q
3y IGG + 2V  GGQQ'  (20) 
Note that Jpp* in (19)  is  evaluated at the optimal quota Qo (whereas Jpp* in (14) is 
evaluated at the optimal state-contingent tariff). 
Let Pc  and Qc denote the optimal domestic price and quota, respectively, when the 
world price equals E(p*) with certainty.  If Jpp*p* is  everywhere positive (negative), then 
E[Jp(p,p*)] is  greater (less)  than Jp(p,E(p*», and hence the left side of the equation in (18) 
is  positive (negative) when evaluated at Pc'  It follows immediately that Po  ~ «) Pc  and Qo ~ 
(»  Qc as  Jpp*p*  ~ «) O.  If the consumer is  "risk neutral" in the public good (V GG = 0), 
then VIGG = V  GGG = 0 and Jpp*p* = O.  In this case,  Po  = Pc  and Qo = Qc'  On the other 
hand, if the consumer is  "risk averse" in the public good (V  GG < 0), and V  GGG ~ 0  ~ 
VIGG, then Jpp*p* > O. 
PROPOSITION 3:  Assume that the optimal quota Qo is  chosen before the foreign price is 
known.  Then (i) if the consumer is  risk neutral in the public good (V  GG = 0), then Po  = Pc 
and Qo =  Qc' and (ii) if the  consume~ is  risk averse in the public good (V  GG < 0) and 
y GGG ~ 0  ~ VIGG,  then Po> Pc  and Qo < Qc' 
Observe that the conditions for the second part of the proposition are not as  restrictive as 
they might appear.  For instance, decreasing absolute risk aversion in the public good 
implies V  GGG ~  0, and strong separability between private goods and the public good 
implies VIG = VIGG = O.  Thus, strong separability and decreasing absolute risk aversion in 
the public good suffice to  imply Po  > Pc' 
Next, consider a monotone increasing and concave transformation of Y(p,I,G) that 
preserves ordinal preferences but increases risk aversion: 
H(p,p*) =  w[J(p,p*)];  w' > 0 > wIt.  (21 ) 
II Then 
(22) 
Note that dw'/dp*  =  w"Jp* >  O.  Evaluating E[Hp1  at Po  yields 
as  Jpp* ~ «) 0,  (23) 
where Jpp* is  given in (19). 
PROPOSITION 4:  Assume that V  IG ~ 0  ~  V  GG.  Then as  the consumer becomes more 
(less) risk averse, the optimal domestic price Po increases (decreases) and the optimal quota 
Qo  decreases (increases). 
Observe that if VIG ~ 0  ~  V GG' then from the implicit maximization problem in (13) for 
the optimal state-contingent policy, private expenditure I becomes a  normal good. 
Optimal Tariff 
Since the foreign price p*  is  readily verifiable ex post, some simple state-contingent 
rules can be established ex ante.  Popular forms of state-contingent policies are (i) a specific 
tariff, (ii) an ad valorem tariff, and (iii) a combination of a specific tariff and an ad 
valorem tariff.  Since the former two instruments are special cases of a composite tariff, we 
will consider the latter.  The domestic price of the importable is  given by 
p  =  k + (1  + a)p*, 
where k is a specific tariff, a  is  an ad valorem tariff, and the total tariff schedule is  t  =  k + 
ap*. 
Expected utility with an optimal tariff schedule is 
E[J(t,p*)] =  E{V[p*  + t,  I(p*  + t),tQ(p)]} ; t  =  k + ap*.  (24) 
12 Optimizing over k and a  gives 
(25a) 
(25b) 
We  now investigate the properties of the second best tariff schedule.  Suppose that only 
a specific tariff can be used (i.e., a  is  constrained to zero), and denote the optimal ex ante 
specific tariff by ko'  Assume that the optimal state-contingent tariff tf(p*) is  monotone in 
p*.  Then there exists a world price, denoted  P~, for which ko  is  the optimal state-
contingent tariff, i.e., ko  =  tf(p*) at P~Y Assume also  that the second order condition, Jtt < 
0,  is  globally satisfied.  Then Jt(ko'p*)  ~  (»  °  as  tf(p*)  ~  (»  ko'  since Jt(tf(p*),p*) = 0.  If 
tf(p*) is  monotonically increasing in p*,  then Jt(ko'p*)  ~ «) °  as  p*  ~ «) P~.  On the other 
hand, if tf(p*) is  monotonically decreasing in p*, then Jt(ko'p*)  ~ «) °  as  P~ ~ «) p*. 
Evaluating the left side of the equality in (25b) at (a,k) =  (O,ko) and using (25a),  we  obtain 
(26) 
since  p~E[Jt] = °  for the optimal specific tariff ko.  If the optimal state-contingent tariff is 
monotone increasing (decreasing) in p*,  then (p*  - p~)Jt is  positive (negative) for all  p*  '" 
p~.  Thus, E[Ja] evaluated at (a,k) = (O,ko) is  positive (negative) if dtf/dp* is  positive 
(negative). 
PROPOSITION 5:  The second best linear tariff schedule includes a positive (negative) ad 
valorem tariff if "Yf.  > «) m,  -tQ"/Q' > «)  I and TJ  + f./s  > «) 0. 
Intuitively, this proposition indicates that the second best tariff schedule tends to  mimic the 
optimal state-contingent tariff by moving in the same direction as  the latter.  It should also 
be noted that since the proof of the proposition depends only upon the properties of the 
optimal state-contingent tariff, the qualitative properties of the second best tariff schedule 
13 are determined only by ordinal preferences. 
IV.  Ranking of Second Best Policies 
We  have indicated earlier the difficulty of implementing the optimal state-contingent 
policy in response to  changes in the foreign price.  Although the preceding analysis of the 
optimal state-contingent tariff is  interesting in its own right, its main value is  not in 
implementation but in facilitating a comparison of second best policies.  The ranking of 
second best policies depends on how each policy behaves relative to the optimal state-
contingent policy.  The policy that maximizes expected utility will most closely approxim.ate 
the optimal state-contingent policy and will be  deemed the superior second best policy. 
We  have assumed that consumer preferences are weakly separable in private goods and 
the public good.  If weak separability is  relaxed, marginal rate of substitution between the 
private goods is  generally affected by changes in the quantity of the public good.  Thus, in 
the general case, the public good is  a determinant of the domestic demand for the 
importable, i.e., X  =  X(p,I,G).  This implies that a change in the foreign price p*  - which 
affects the level of the public good (p - p*)Q - results in a "shift" in the import demand 
schedule.  If weak separability is  assuqled,  the domestic demand for the importable reduces 
to  X(p,I).  Accordingly, the import demand function, Q(p) = X(p,I(p» - Y(p), is 
independent of the foreign price.  Thus, under weak separability an import quota Qo is 
equivalent to fixing the domestic price of the importable at Po  such that Qo = Q(po)' 
From the expression of the domestic price, p =  k + (1  + Q)p*,  if the ad valorem tariff Q 
were equal to (-1), then the composite tariff schedule results in a stable target price, p =  k. 
That is, an import quota, which is  equivalent to  (domestic) target pricing of the importable, 
can be viewed as  a special case of the composite tariff where Q =  -1.  Thus, the optimal 
composite tariff schedule dominates the optimal quota. 
We  now investigate the ranking of a second best specific tariff ko  and a second best 
quota Qo (which stabilizes the domestic price at Po)'  Suppose that the optimal state-
14 contingent tariff tf(p*) is  monotonically increasing in  p*.  From the analysis of the previous 
section, it is  immediately apparent that the second best specific tariff ko  dominates the 
second best Quota, since (i) a Quota  is  equivalent to  a composite tariff with the ad valorem 
tariff Q  =  -1, whereas (ii) the optimal composite tariff entails a positive ad valorem tariff. 
More formally, let Po  be the domestic price under the optimal Quota, and pf(p*) be  the 
optimal state-contingent domestic price of the importable.  Then there exists a world price, 
denoted p*, for which Po  is  the optimal state-contingent price, as  shown in Figure I.  Let k 
=  pf(p*) _ p*, and let pk  =  (p*  + k) denote the domestic price under a constant specific 
tariff k.  Since dtfjdp* > 0, it follows  that Po  > pk  > pf for  p*  < p*  and pf > pk  > Po  for p* 
> p*.  Thus, the domestic price pk  under the specific tariff k  is  everywhere closer to  the 
optimal state-contingent price pf than is  the target price Po  under the optimal Quota Qo' 
Since this specific tariff k dominates the optimal Quota,  the optimal specific tariff ko  must 
also dominate the latter. 
PROPOSITION 6:  If "If.  > m, -tQ"jQ' >  1 and  TJ  + f.js  > 0, then the optimal specific tariff 
ko  dominates the optimal Quota Qo'  regardless of risk aversion. 
Note that the proposition is  independent of cardinal preferences, as  the behavior of the 
optimal state-contingent tariff is  determined only by ordinal preferences.  Changes in  risk 
attitudes do not affect (dtfjdp*), and hence cannot reverse the ranking of second best 
policies where (dtfjdp*) is  positive. 
Risk Aversion 
If the optimal state-contingent tariff is  monotone decreasing or not monotone in p* 
everywhere, then information about ordinal preferences is  insufficient to  rank the second 
best policies.  We  now illustrate how cardinal preferences may affect the ranking of second 
best policies.  Let Jk  = J(p*+k,p*),  JO  = J(po'P*) and Jf = J(p*+tf,p*) denote the realized 
utility under a specific tariff k, a Quota Qo' and the optimal state-contingent tariff tf, 
15 respectively.  First, we investigate the general conditions under which the optimal specific 
tariff dominates the optimal quota.  If Qo is  the optimal quota, there exists a world price, 
denoted p*, for which (Po  - p*) is  the optimal state-contingent tariff, i.e., tf(p*) = Po  - p*  :; 
k.  Moreover, p*  is  unique, since dpf/dp* > 0 by Proposition l.  If the constant specific 
tariff k dominates the optimal quota, then the optimal specific tariff must also dominate the 
latter. 




Recall that at p*, Po = p*  + k = p*  + tf(p*), and hence Jk  = J
O  = Jf.  Moreover, when 
evaluated at p*,  J~* = Jp * =  J~*; but Jf ~  Jk  and Jf ~ J
O  everywhere.  Thus, these functions 
are monotone decreasing in p*  and are tangent at p*, as shown in Figure II.  Thus, a 
comparison of the curvatures of Jk  and J
O  could reveal which policy yields a higher utility 
ex post. 
Differentiating (27a) and (27b) with respect to p*  yields 
JO  yo  Q2.  p*p*  =  GG  0'  (28b) 
If the consumer is  risk averse (neutral) in the public good, then the indirect utility J
O  under 
the optimal quota is  concave (linear) in p*,  but the curvature of Jk  is  generally ambiguous. 
To compare the curvatures of Jk  and J
O
,  let !:l.  :;  J~*p* - JP*p*.  Then 
16 where R = - IV  II/V  I is  the relative risk aversion index.  If t::.  is  positive, then (Jk  - J
O
)  is 
convex in p*.  Since Jk  and J
O  are tangent at p*, (Jk - J
O
)  obtains a (global) minimum at p*. 
Moreover, Jk  >  J
O  for all p*  '" p*  and hence Jk  =  J
O  at p*,  the specific tariff k dominates the 
optimal quota (See  Figure II).  A fortiori, the optimal specific tariff dominates the optimal 
quota. 
PROPOSITION 7:  If V GG = 0 .$ V IG' Q"  ~ 0, and TJ  + f/S  ~ R, then the optimal specific 
tariff dominates the optimal quota.  Alternatively, if V GG =  0  ~ VIG, Q"  .$ 0, and  TJ  + f./s  .$. 
R, then the optimal quota dominates the optimal specific tariff. 
In contrast to Proposition 6, this proposition allows  the ranking of ex ante second best 
policies when the representative consumer is  risk averse.  Moreover, its assumptions 
correspond to those in the expected revenue constraint models considered by Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1977), and Young (1980a,  1980b)Y  If the policy maker is  comparing policies with 
the same expected revenue and dispersion of revenue does not matter, the representative 
consumer is  implicitly assumed to  be risk neutral in the public good (V  GG = 0).  Moreover, 
for expected consumer surplus to  be a valid welfare measure under uncertainty, the marginal 
utility of income must be invariant with respect to  the random price, i.e., Vip =  - VIIX -
VIXI = 0 or R =  TJ  (Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz, 1980), as  well as  with respect to the 
random public good, i.e., VIG = 0 (See  Rogerson,  1980).14  Finally, if the import demand is 
linear, then Q"  =  O.  With  these assumptions and additive disturbances Young (1980b) 
demonstrated that the optimal specific tariff is  superior to the optimal quota.  While  the 
sufficient conditions in Proposition 7 are more general, they are certainly satisfied by the 
implicit assumptions in the expected revenue constraint models.  Observe also that when 
V  IG < 0 =  V  GG' private expenditure is  an inferior good (aI/8B < 0).  This suggests that 
insofar as  private expenditure is  a normal good it is  unlikely for the optimal quota to 
dominate the optimal specific tariff. 
17 V.  Concluding Remarks 
Despite its well known optimality free trade is  rarely practiced by LDCs.  The literature 
has compared tariffs and quotas under uncertainty for a small country with a constraint on 
expected import or expected government revenue.  This paper emphasizes the revenue 
motive for trade taxes in LDCs, and investigates optimal trade policies when trade taxes are 
used to  finance public goods.  Specifically, we investigated the properties of optimal state-
contingent policy and ex ante policies.  While  the optimal state-contingent policy is  difficult 
to  implement, its properties provide ",aluable information on the ranking of second best 
policies. 
If demands for private goods are independent of the public good, a change in the 
foreign price does not shift the import demand function.  An import quota is  then 
equivalent to a fixed domestic price of the importable even in the presence of the foreign 
price uncertainty.  Since the specific tariff is  state-independent, a supplementary ad valorem 
tariff can be utilized to enable the second best tariff schedule to  better approximate the 
optimal state-contingent tariff.  Moreover, the optimal composite tariff always dominates 
the optimal quota.  When a single instrument is  used, the ranking of specific tariffs and 
quotas is  generally ambiguous, and depends on the curvatures of the indirect utility function 
(with respect to  income and the public good) and the import demand function.  When  the 
optimal state-contingent tariff is  monotonically increasing in the foreign price, the optimal 
specific tariff dominates the optimal quota, regardless of risk aversion.  If the optimal state-
contingent tariff is  not increasing in the foreign price everywhere or the behavior of the 
optimal state-contingent tariff is  difficult to  ascertain, risk attitudes and ordinal preferences 
jointly determine the ranking of second best policies. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1.  Bhagwati (1965,  1968) has shown that under certain competitive conditions import 
quotas and tariffs are equivalent.  Equivalence does  not hold under retaliation 
(Rodriguez,  1974).  However, equivalence holds if foreign demand is  uncertainty-free 
even when domestic markets are subject to  uncertainty (Ohta,  1978). 
2.  However, Batra and Naqvi (1987) emphasize that the first best policy is  a wage 
subsidy, rather than a tariff.  For further analyses of variable returns to scale, see  for 
example Eaton and Panagariya (1979). 
3.  The ranking of trade policies under an expected revenue constraint has also  been 
investigated.  For instance, using social surplus areas Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1977) and 
Young (1980) compared quotas and ad valorem tariffs that yield the same expected 
revenue. 
20 4.  Turnovsky, Shalit and Schmitz (1980) showed that expected surplus criterion is  a 
valid welfare measure only if the marginal utility of income is  constant.  For this r.eason 
Young and Anderson (1982) employ expected utility. 
5.  Naturally, a first best policy for raising revenue would involve taxes on resources in 
fixed supply.  Alternatively, if we  imagine an economy with a production possibility 
curve using resources in fixed supply, a simultaneous consumption (or production) tax 
on both goods would raise revenue without distorting relative prices.  Presumably, the 
rationale for trade taxes is  either that such domestic taxes are infeasible or that factor 
supplies are endogenous.  If factor taxes are feasible and factor supplies are endogenous, 
then optimal policy would in general require a mix of trade and factor taxes as  in 
Boadway, Maital and Prachowny (1973). 
6.  See  Eaton and Grossman (1985) for models with different agents.  Cassing and 
Hillman (1985) analyze political influence motives in trade policies with an implicit 
assumption of different agents. 
7.  The income of the consumer is  I =  Z + P  Y(p).  If T denotes the amount of Z 
exported, domestic consumption of the exportable is  C =  Z  - G  - T.  If trade is 
balanced, T = p*Q, then the total expendjture is  C + pX = (Z - G  - T) + p(Q + Y) = Z 
+ pY, equal to national income. 
8.  This assumption of constant marginal rate of transformation (MRT) between the 
exportable and the public good is  not as  restrictive as  it appears.  If G  =  tNQ is 
government revenue and g represents the quantity of the public good produced, then for 
a general transformation function g =  g(G) MRT varies as  G changes, g'(G) >  O.  In this 
case, the direct utility function can be  rewritten 
U[f(C,X),g(G)]  ==  u[f(C,X),G], 
where the new utility function u(.) is  expressed in terms of government expenditure G, 
rather than the public good g.  The corresponding indirect utility can also  be  written 
V[p,l,g(G)]  ==  v[p,I,G]. 
With  this modification, all the results of the paper hold when V is  replaced by v. 
9.  It is  interesting to  note that [MRS = N(V G/VI) = 1/(1  + e~), where  e~ == 
(aQ/at)(t/Q) is  the elasticity of imports with respect to  the tariff.  This is  a special case 
of a more general result in Feehan (1988, p.  160).  However, we  sacrifice some 
generality here to obtain a ranking of second best policies under uncertainty. 
10.  See  Becker (1965) for the notion of full income.  For the typical consumer utility 
maximization problem, money income is  independent of price changes.  However, with 
the utility maximization problem with the full income constraint, "full income" is 
dependent on the relative price e of the public good. 
II.  See  Fishelson and Flatters (1975) for nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas under 
uncertainty. 
12.  Let ta =  tf(p!) and tb  =  tf(p~) be  the minimum and the maximum of the first best 
tariff, occurring at p! and  p~, respectively.  If ko  is  less  than ta (greater than tb),  then 
21 Jt(ko'p*) is  positive (negative) everywhere and hence E[Jt(ko'p*)] is  positive (negative). 
This violates the first order condition (25a).  Thus, ta  ~ ko  ~ tb'  Since tf(p*) is  a 
continuous function, there must be a price  p~ in the interval between p! and  p~ (p! > or 
<  p~), for which tf(p~) =  ko' 
13.  Young (1980a) demonstrated that the ranking of ad valorem tariffs and quotas 
under an expected revenue constraint is  generally ambiguous. 
14.  Rogerson (1980) further states that for expected consumer surplus to  be a valid 
welfare criterion under uncertainty the marginal utility of income must be invariant with 
respect all random variables.  Choi and Johnson (1987) show that expected equivalent 
variation is  a better measure than expected consumer surplus. 
22 p =  p* 
k 
o  p*  p* 
Figure 1.  Specific Tariff Versus  Quota J 
Jf 
o  p* 
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